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Introduction
Nash equilibrium is the central notion of rational behavior in noncooperative game theory.
1 Our purpose here is to discuss various conditions under which a strategic form game possesses at least one Nash equilibrium.
Strategic settings arising in economics are often naturally modeled as games with in…nite strategy spaces. For example, models of price and spatial competition (Bertrand (1883) , Hotelling (1929) ), quantity competition (Cournot (1838) ), auctions (Milgrom and Weber (1982) ), patent races (Fudenberg et. al. (1983) ), etc., typically allow players to choose any one of a continuum of actions. The analytic convenience of the continuum from both an equilibrium characterization and comparative statics point of view is perhaps the central reason for the prevalence and usefulness of in…nite-action games. Because of this, our treatment will permit both …nite-action and in…nite-action games.
Games with possibly in…nite strategy spaces can be divided into two categories: those with continuous payo¤s and those with discontinuous payo¤s. Cournot oligopoly models and Bertrand price-competition models with di¤erentiated products, as well as all …nite-action games, are important examples of continuous games, while Bertrand price-competition with homogeneous products, auctions, and Hotelling spatial competition, are important examples in which payo¤s are discontinuous. Equilibrium existence results for both continuous and discontinuous games will be reviewed here. We begin with some notation.
A strategic form game, G = (S i ; u i )
; consists of a positive …nite number, N; of players, and for each player i 2 f1; :::; N g; a non empty set of pure strategies, S i ; and a payo¤ function u i : S ! R; where S = N i=1 S i : The notation s i and S i have their conventional meanings: s i = (s 1 ; :::; s i 1 ; s i+1 ; :::; s N ) and S i = j6 =i S j : Throughout, we shall assume that each S i is a subset of some metric space and that if any …nite number of sets are each endowed with a topology, then the product of those sets is endowed with the product topology.
Continuous Games

Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria
Pure strategy equilibria are more basic than their mixed strategy counterparts for at least two reasons. First, pure strategies do not require the players to possess preferences over lotteries. Second, mixed strategy equilibrium existence results often follow as corollaries of the pure strategy results. It is therefore natural to consider …rst the case of pure strategies.
De…nition 2.1. s 2 S is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of G = (S i ; u i )
An important and very useful result is the following. Theorem 2.2. If each S i is a non empty, compact, convex subset of a metric space, and each u i (s 1 ; :::; s N ) is continuous in (s 1 ; :::; s N ) and quasi-concave in
possesses at least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proof. For each player i; and each s i 2 S i ; let B i (s i ) denote the set of maximizers in S i of u i ( ; s i ): The continuity of u i and the compactness of S i ensure that B i (s i ) is non empty and also ensure, given the compactness of S i ; that the correspondence, B i : S i S i is upper hemicontinuous. The quasiconcavity of u i in s i implies that B i (s i ) is convex. Consequently, each B i is upper hemicontinuous, non empty-valued and convex-valued. All three of these properties are therefore inherited by the correspondence B :
each s 2 S: Consequently, we may apply Glicksberg's (1952) …xed point theorem to B and conclude that there existsŝ 2 S such thatŝ 2 B(ŝ): Thisŝ is therefore a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Remark 1. The theorem remains valid when "metric space" is replaced by "locally convex Hausdor¤ topological vector space."
Remark 2. The convexity property of strategy sets and the quasiconcavity of payo¤s in own action cannot be dispensed with. For example, strategy sets are not convex in matching pennies, and even though the continuity and compactness assumptions hold there, no pure strategy equilibrium exists. On the other hand, in the two-person zero-sum game in which both players' compact convex pure strategy set is [ 1; 1] and player 1's payo¤ function is u 1 (s 1 ; s 2 ) = js 1 + s 2 j ; all of the assumptions of Theorem 2.2 hold except the quasiconcavity of u 1 in s 1 . But this is enough to preclude the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium because in any such equilibrium player 2's payo¤ would have to be zero (given s 1 ; 2 can choose s 2 = s 1 ) and 1's payo¤ would have to be positive (given s 2 ; 1 can choose
Remark 3. More general results for continuous games can be found in Debreu (1952) and Schafer and Sonnenschein (1975) . Existence results for games with strategic complements on lattices can be found in Milgrom and Roberts (1990) and Vives (1990) .
Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria
A mixed strategy for player i is a probability measure, m i ; over S i : If S i is …nite, then m i (s i ) denotes the probability assigned to s i 2 S i by the mixed strategy m i ; and i's set of mixed strategies is the compact convex subset of Euclidean space
In general, we shall not require S i to be …nite. Rather, we shall suppose only that it is a subset of some metric space. In this more general case, a mixed strategy for player i is a (regular, countably-additive) probability measure, m i ; over the Borel subsets of S i ; for any Borel subset A of S i ; m i (A) denotes the probability assigned to A by the mixed strategy m i : Player i's set of such mixed strategies, M i ; is then convex. Further, if S i is compact, the convex set M i is compact in the weak-topology. 
if m is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the mixed extension, G; of G. That is, if for every player i;
Because u i (m i ; m i ) is linear, and therefore quasi-concave, in m i 2 M i for each m i 2 M i ; and because continuity of u i ( ) on S implies continuity of u i ( ) on M (in the weak-topology), Theorem 2.2 applied to the mixed extension of G yields the following basic mixed strategy Nash equilibrium existence result Corollary 2.4. If each S i is a non-empty compact subset of a metric space, and
possesses at least one mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, m 2 M:
Remark 4. Note that Corollary 2.4 does not require u i (s i ; s i ) to be quasiconcave in s i ; nor does it require the S i to be convex.
Remark 5. Corollary 2.4 yields von Neumann's (1928) classic result for twoperson zero-sum games as well as Nash's (1950 Nash's ( , 1951 seminal result for …nite games as special cases. To obtain Nash's result, note that if each S i is …nite, then each u i is continuous on S in the discrete metric. Hence, the corollary applies and we conclude that every …nite game possesses at least one mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
Remark 6. To see how Theorem 2.2 can be applied to obtain the existence of mixed strategy equilibria in Bayesian games, see Milgrom and Weber (1985) .
Discontinuous Games
The basic challenge one must overcome in extending equilibrium existence results from continuous games to discontinuous games is the failure of the best reply correspondence to satisfy the properties required for application of a …xed point theorem. For example, in auction or Bertrand price-competition settings, discontinuities in payo¤s sometimes preclude the existence of best replies. The best reply correspondence then fails to be non empty valued and Glicksberg's theorem, for example, cannot be applied.
A natural technique for overcoming such di¢ culties is to approximate the in…nite strategy spaces by a sequence of …ner and …ner …nite approximations. Each of the approximating …nite games is guaranteed to possesses a mixed strategy equilibrium (by Corollary 2.4) and the resulting sequence of equilibria is guaranteed, by compactness, to possesses at least one limit point. Under appropriate assumptions, the limit point is a Nash equilibrium of the original game. This technique has been cleverly employed in Dasgupta and Maskin's (1986) pioneering work, and also by Simon (1987) . However, while this …nite approximation technique can yield results on the existence of mixed strategy Nash equilibria, it is unable to produce equally general existence results for pure strategy Nash equilibria. The reason, of course, is that the approximating games, being …nite, are guaranteed to possess mixed strategy, but not necessarily pure strategy, Nash equilibria. Consequently, the sequence of equilibria, and so also the limit point, cannot be guaranteed to be pure.
One might be tempted to conclude that, unlike the continuous game case where the mixed strategy result is a special case of the pure strategy result, discontinuous games require a separate treatment of pure and mixed strategy equilibria. But such a conclusion would be premature. A connection between pure and mixed strategy equilibrium existence results similar to that for continuous games can be obtained for discontinuous games by considering a di¤erent kind of approximation. Rather than approximating the in…nite strategy spaces by a sequence of …nite approximations, one can instead approximate the discontinuous payo¤ functions by a sequence of continuous payo¤ functions. This payo¤-approximation technique is employed in Reny (1999) , whose main result we now proceed to describe. All of the de…nitions, notation, and conventions of the previous sections remain in e¤ect. In particular, each S i is a subset of some metric space. Thus, a payo¤ can be secured by i at s if i has a strategy that guarantees at least that payo¤ even if the other players deviate slightly from s:
A pair (s; u) 2 S R N is in the closure of the graph of the vector payo¤ function if u 2 R N is the limit of the vector of player payo¤s for some sequence of strategies converging to s: That is, if u = lim n (u 1 (s n ); :::; u N (s n )) for some s n ! s:
is better-reply secure if whenever (s ; u ) is in the closure of the graph of its vector payo¤ function and s is not a Nash equilibrium, some player i can secure a payo¤ strictly above u i at s :
All games with continuous payo¤ functions are better-reply secure. This is because if (s ; u ) is in the closure of the graph of the vector payo¤ function of a continuous game, we must have u = (u 1 (s ); :::; u N (s )): Also, if s is not a Nash equilibrium then some player i has a strategy s i such that u i ( s i ; s i ) > u i (s ); and continuity ensures that this inequality is maintained even if the others deviate slightly from s . Consequently, player i can secure a payo¤ strictly above u i = u i (s ):
The import of better-reply security is that it is also satis…ed in many discontinuous games. For example, Bertrand's price-competition game, many auction games, and many games of timing are better-reply secure.
Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria
The following theorem provides a pure strategy Nash equilibrium existence result for discontinuous games.
Theorem 3.1. (Reny (1999) ) If each S i is a non empty, compact, convex subset of a metric space, and each u i (s 1 ; :::; s N ) is quasi-concave in
possesses at least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium if in addition G is betterreply secure.
Remark 7. Theorem 2.2 is a special case of Theorem 3.1 because every continuous game is better-reply secure.
Remark 8. A classic result due to Sion (1958) states that every two-person zero-sum game with compact strategy spaces in which player 1's payo¤ is uppersemicontinuous and quasi-concave in his own strategy, and lower-semicontinuous and quasi-convex in the opponent's strategy has a value and each player has an optimal pure strategy.
6 It is not di¢ cult to show that Sion's result is a special case of Theorem 3.1.
Remark 9. A related result that weakens quasi-concavity but adds conditions to the sum of the players'payo¤s can be found in Baye, Tian, and Zhou (1993) . Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) provide two interesting pure strategy equilibrium existence results, both of which require each player's payo¤ function to upper semicontinuous in the vector of all players'strategies.
Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria
One easily obtains from Theorem 3.1 a mixed strategy equilibrium existence result (the analogue of Corollary 2.4) by treating each M i as if it were player i's pure strategy set and by applying the de…nition of better-reply security to the mixed extension G = (M i ; u i ) of G: This observation yields the following useful result. Remark 10. Better-reply security of G neither implies nor is implied by betterreply security of G: 7 Remark 11. Corollary 2.4 is a special case of Corollary 3.2 because continuity of each u i (s) in s 2 S implies (weak-) continuity of u i (m) in m 2 M; which implies that the mixed extension, G; is better-reply secure.
Remark 12. Corollary 3.2 has as special cases the mixed strategy equilibrium existence results of Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) , Simon (1987) and Robson (1994) . 6 Sion does not actually prove the existence of optimal startegies, but this follows rather easily from his compactness assumptions and his result that the game has a value, i.e. that infsup=supinf.
7 See Reny (1999) for su¢ cient conditions for better-reply security.
Remark 13. Theorem 3.1 can similarly be used to obtain a result on the existence of mixed strategy equilibria in discontinuous Bayesian games by following Milgrom and Weber's (1985) seminal distributional strategy approach. One simply replaces Milgrom and Weber's payo¤ continuity assumption with the assumption that the Bayesian game is better-reply secure in distributional strategies. An example of this technique is provided in the next section.
An Application to Auctions
Auctions are an important class of economic games in which payo¤s are discontinuous. Furthermore, when bidders are asymmetric, in general one cannot prove existence of equilibrium by construction, as in the symmetric case. Consequently, an existence theorem applicable to discontinuous games is called for. Let us very brie ‡y sketch how Theorem 3.1 can be applied in this case. Consider a …rst-price single-object auction with N bidders. Each bidder i receives a private value v i 2 [0; 1] prior to submitting a sealed bid, b i 0: Bidder i's value is drawn independently according to the continuous and positive density f i : The highest bidder wins the object and pays his bid. Ties are broken randomly and equiprobably. Losers pay nothing.
Because payo¤s are not quasiconcave in own bids, one cannot appeal directly to Theorem 3.1 to establish the existence of an equilibrium in pure strategy bidding functions. On the other hand, it is not di¢ cult to show that all mixed strategy equilibria are pure and nondecreasing. Hence, to obtain an existence result for pure strategies, it su¢ ces to show that there is an equilibrium in mixed, or equivalently in distributional, strategies.
Endogenous Sharing Rules
Discontinuities in payo¤s sometimes arise endogenously. For example, consider a political game in which candidates …rst choose a policy from the interval [0,1] and each voter among a continuum then decides for whom to vote. Voters vote for the candidate whose policy they most prefer and if there is more than one such candidate it is conventional to assume that voters randomize equiprobably over them. The behavior of voters in the second stage can induce discontinuities in the payo¤s of the candidates in the …rst stage since a candidate can discontinuously gain or lose a positive fraction of votes by choosing a policy that, instead of being identical to another candidate's policy is just slightly di¤erent from it.
An elegant way to handle such discontinuities is suggested by Simon and Zame (1990) . In particular, for the political game example above, they would not insist that voters, when indi¤erent, randomize equiprobably. Indeed, applying subgame perfection to the two-stage game would permit voters to randomize in any manner whatsoever over those candidates whose policies they most prefer. With this in mind, if s is a joint pure strategy for the N candidates specifying a location for each, let us denote by U (s) the resulting set of payo¤ vectors for the N candidates when all best replies of the voters are considered. If no voter is indi¤erent, then U (s) contains a single payo¤ vector. On the other hand, if some voters are indifferent (as would be the case if two or more candidates chose the same location) and U (s) is not a singleton, then distinct payo¤ vectors in U (s) correspond to di¤erent ways the indi¤erent voters can randomize between the candidates among whom they are indi¤erent.
The signi…cance of the correspondence U ( ) is this. Suppose that we are able to select, for each s; a payo¤ vector u(s) 2 U (s) in such a way that some joint mixed strategy m for the N candidates is a Nash equilibrium of the induced policy-choice game between them when their vector payo¤ function is u( ): Then m together with the voter behavior that is implicit in the de…nition of u(s) for each s; constitutes a subgame perfect equilibrium of the original two-stage game. Thus, solving the original problem with potentially endogenous discontinuities boils down to obtaining an appropriate selection from U ( ): Simon and Zame (1990) provide a general result concerning the existence of such selections, which they also refer to as "endogenous sharing rules." This method therefore provides an additional tool for obtaining equilibrium existence when discontinuities are present. Simon and Zame's main result is as follows.
Theorem 3.3. (Simon and Zame (1990) ) Suppose that each S i is a compact subset of a metric space and that U : S R N is a bounded, upper hemicontinuous, non empty-valued, convex-valued correspondence. Then for each player i; there is a measurable payo¤ function, u i : S ! R; such that (u 1 (s); :::; u N (s)) 2 U (s) for every s 2 S and such that the game (S i ; u i ) N i=1 possesses at least one mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
